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To what extent can people choose advantageously without knowing why they are mak-
ing those choices?This hotly debated question has capitalized on the Iowa GamblingTask
(IGT), in which people often learn to choose advantageously without appearing to know
why. However, because the IGT is unconstrained in many respects, this ﬁnding remains
debated and other interpretations are possible (e.g., risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, lim-
its of working memory, or insensitivity to reward/punishment can explain the ﬁnding of the
IGT). Here we devised an improved variant of the IGT in which the deck-payoff contingency
switches after subjects repeatedly choose from a good deck, offering the statistical power
of repeated within-subject measures based on learning the reward contingencies associ-
ated with each deck.We found that participants exhibited low conﬁdence in their choices,
as probed with post-decision wagering, despite high accuracy in selecting advantageous
decks in the task, which is putative evidence for non-conscious decision making. However,
such a behavioral dissociation could also be explained by risk aversion, a tendency to avoid
risky decisions under uncertainty. By explicitly measuring risk aversion for each individual,
we predicted subjects’ post-decision wagering using Bayesian modeling. We found that
risk aversion indeed does play a role, but that it did not explain the entire effect. More-
over, independently measured risk aversion was uncorrelated with risk aversion exhibited
during our version of the IGT, raising the possibility that the latter risk aversion may be non-
conscious. Our ﬁndings support the idea that people can make optimal choices without
being fully aware of the basis of their decision. We suggest that non-conscious decision
making may be mediated by emotional feelings of risk that are based on mechanisms
distinct from those that support cognitive assessment of risk.
Keywords: decision making, consciousness, risk aversion, post-decision wagering, confidence
INTRODUCTION
Decision making refers to a process of forming preferences, select-
ing and executing an action from alternatives, and evaluating and
predicting rewarding or aversive outcomes. Whether we can make
accurate and optimal decisions without full conscious awareness
of the basis for the decision remains controversial, while evidence
for non-conscious processing itself has been established in the per-
ceptual domain [e.g., implicit memory and priming (Kouider and
Dehaene, 2007)]. Some evidence suggests that neuropsychological
patients with damage to primary visual cortex lack visual phenom-
enal awareness, yet can successfully make many visually guided
decisions (Stoerig et al., 2002; Persaud et al., 2007). Under cer-
tain circumstances, neurologically healthy subjects seem to make
advantageous decisions without knowing why, for instance when
they face a situation where the number of relevant parameters
exceeds the limits of conscious working memory (Dijksterhuis
et al., 2006).
Another possible instance of non-conscious decision making
is reported in a number of studies using the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT). In the past decade, the IGT has been extensively used as a
probe for decision making in situations that feature uncertainty,
reward, and punishment, mimicking aspects of real life (Dama-
sio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1997, 1999, 2000; Anderson et al., 1999;
Fellows, 2004; Oya et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 2006). In the IGT,
participants are faced with four decks of cards. In each trial, they
choose one deck and draw a card from it. Each card is associ-
ated with a variable amount of monetary gain. In some trials,
it is followed by a large amount of loss. In the long run, par-
ticipants lose money on some decks, but win money on others.
Yet the complexity of payoffs in the IGT prevents subjects from
calculating the expected value associated with each deck, and sub-
jects typically feel as though they are guessing when making their
choices, especially early on in the task. Past studies of the IGT have
reported an intriguing phenomenon, which motivated our study:
subjects start to make advantageous card selections well before
they can verbalize why they selected those decks (Bechara et al.,
1997; Persaud et al., 2007). Remarkably, their autonomic response,
as measured by skin conductance, also distinguishes good and bad
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deck selection before the subjects can verbalize the basis of their
deck selection (Bechara et al., 1997), supporting the theory that
emotional response informs complex decision making (Damasio,
1994; Bechara et al., 2000; but also, see Tomb et al., 2002; Dunn
et al., 2006). Though an intriguing ﬁnding, the claim that decision
making occurs in the absence of awareness in the IGT has been
criticized on several grounds. In particular, Maia and McClelland
(2004, 2005) have criticized the operational deﬁnition of “non-
conscious,” arguing that people may be vaguely aware of their
strategy even though they do not say so with open-ended ques-
tions (Bechara et al., 1997). When subjects were probed every 10
trials by a set of questionnaires, which involves numerical rating
of the goodness of each deck, direct estimation of the expected
payoff of each deck, expression of the best strategy for the IGT,
and so on, it was found that they started to make optimal choices
at the same time as they started to show some form of conscious
awareness (Maia and McClelland, 2004; Persaud et al., 2007).
However, these detailed questionnaires have themselves been
criticized because they force subjects to introspect in an unnatural
way during decision making (Koch and Preuschoff, 2007), thus
undermining the methods for identifying implicit knowledge by
prompting subjects to become aware when they otherwise would
not (Bechara et al., 2005). To address this problem, Persaud et al.
(2007) proposed an alternative measure of awareness, which is
objective in that it does not rely on subjective ratings, and also
indirect and less obtrusive compared to the detailed questionnaire
used by Maia and McClelland (2004). In Persaud et al.’s post-
decision wagering task, subjects indirectly reveal the conﬁdence
that they have in their decision by wagering high or low on the
expected outcome of their choice. A correct choice followed by
a high wager is taken as an index of conscious awareness. When
probed with open-ended questions (Bechara et al., 1997), post-
decision wagering replicated the original ﬁndings: subjects chose
advantageously from the decks before they showed any evidence of
conscious awareness as revealed by post-decision wagering. How-
ever, when probed with a more intrusive questionnaire (Maia and
McClelland, 2004), advantageous deck choices and optimal post-
decision wagers developed concurrently. These results reconcile
the previous ﬁndings and underline the fact that detailed inquiry
of conscious awareness can alter the very conscious access one
intends to measure.
The validity of post-decision wagering as a probe of con-
sciousness, however, has yet to be fully demonstrated (Koch and
Preuschoff, 2007; Clifford et al., 2008a; Schurger and Sher, 2008;
Dienes and Seth, 2010; Fleming and Dolan, 2010; Sandberg et al.,
2010). The ensuing critiques have argued that there is a distinction
between true performance without awareness on the one hand,
and simply a reluctance, on the other hand, to gamble with weak
sensory evidencedespite full awareness (Clifford et al., 2008a). This
second possibility is “risk aversion” (Koch and Preuschoff, 2007;
Schurger and Sher, 2008), the well-known ﬁnding that people will
often make a choice that has a lower expected value than some
other option, if it also has less variance in its payoffs. This phenom-
enon is accounted for by assuming that people maximize utility
rather than expected value, where utility is a concave function
of value for risk-averse individuals (and convex for risk-seeking
individuals) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rabin, 2000;Holt and
Laury,2002). Therefore, risk-averse subjects often turndowngam-
bles with positive expected value, simply because the variance (or
their belief about the variance) in payoffs is sufﬁciently high that
their utility for the gamble is lower than an alternative option.
In other words, subjects’ wagering strategies may be a reﬂection
of their attitude toward risk, and so sub-optimal wagering may
be perfectly consistent with their preferences (Schurger and Sher,
2008). In fact, Dienes and Seth (2010) found correlation between
risk aversion and the degree of non-conscious knowledge inferred
from wagering. It is therefore critical to understand the role of risk
aversion in post-decision wagering in order to fully dissect the role
of non-conscious processes in decision making.
There are additional aspects in the task design of the IGT
itself (Fellows, 2004; Dunn et al., 2006; Bossaerts et al., 2008),
which preclude an unequivocal interpretation either for or against
non-conscious decision making. Notably, the IGT has at most
one onset of awareness and is essentially a one-shot experiment,
where subjects are not allowed to practice the task and they are
not informed of any critical information about the task structure
(e.g., the possible payoff structure for each deck, when the task
ends, etc.). In such a situation, people are known to exhibit ambi-
guity aversion (Ellsberg, 1963; Camerer and Weber, 1992; Rode
et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 2005), which may or may not be related
to non-conscious decision making. In the economics literature,
ambiguity refers to situations where the probabilities of the dif-
ferent outcomes are unknown. Ambiguity aversion then refers to
the fact that most people tend to avoid choosing options where
the probabilities are unknown. It is important to note that risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion are separate phenomena. Risk
aversion describes an individual’s aversion to variance in pay-
offs while ambiguity aversion describes an individual’s aversion to
unknown probabilities (lack of information about the likelihood
of the outcomes).
In addition, due to the IGT’s one-shot nature, subjects can
notice which decks are good at most once during the experiment.
This is statistically inefﬁcient, yielding effects that are sometimes
unreliable even in healthy normal controls (Dunn et al., 2006).
While a previous study (Oya et al., 2005) applied a reinforcement
learning algorithm to the IGT to solve some of these difﬁculties, it
remains unclear how to incorporate risk aversion effects into rein-
forcement learning under the unconstrained parameters of the
original IGT (Bossaerts et al., 2008).
The goal of our study was to test for non-conscious decision
making while ruling out other explanations. Toward that aim, we
modiﬁed the IGT in four important ways. First, we incorporated
post-decision wagering to probe subjects’ awareness indirectly in
each trial (Persaud et al., 2007). Second, to improve statistical
power, we repeatedly reshufﬂed deck-payoff contingencies once
subjects noticed the contingency, resulting in multiple epochs of
learning, and choice within each subject. Third, to eliminate ambi-
guity and heterogeneous priors about the task structure, we told
subjects the structure of the game by detailing the distribution of
payoffs from the fourdecks (butwithout identifying the locationof
the decks). This also allowed us to apply a formal Bayesian model
to subjects’ choices. Fourth, we measured each subject’s risk aver-
sion proﬁle with a similar but explicit task where they were asked
to wager on various gambles with different expected values and
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levels of risk (shown explicitly). We incorporated this measure of
explicit risk aversion into the Bayesian model to predict subjects’
wagering behaviors.
With our modiﬁed version of the IGT,we replicated the ﬁnding
that there is a gap between when subjects start to choose optimally
in the IGT and when they start to bet high in the post-decision
wagering task (Persaud et al., 2007). Subjects wagered high much
less often than predicted from the Bayesian model incorporating
their risk aversion proﬁles. Thus, the discrepancy between good
choice behavior yet poorwagering cannot be fully explainedby risk
aversion alone. We also found that risk aversion in our modiﬁed
IGT and in the explicit task were uncorrelated.We suggest that risk
aversion observed in our version of the IGT may reﬂect processes
that are distinct from those at work when payoff probabilities are
explicitly known. Such implicit risk aversion may arise from the
feeling of risk (Loewenstein et al., 2001) under complicated real
life situations where no explicit probabilities are available and may
be an instance of a“somatic marker” that helps us navigate choices
and plans in everyday life (Damasio, 1994).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
We carried out two experiments, involving separate subject sam-
ples. Each experiment consisted of the two phases described below,
but their order was counterbalanced.
Experiment 1
Sixteen students (six females) from the California Institute of
Technology (Caltech) gave written informed consent according
to a protocol approved by the Caltech IRB. The age of subjects
ranged from 18 to 24 (mean= 21). Their psychological and eco-
nomic background information was collected at the end of the
experiment.
All participants ﬁrst participated in 100 trials of a computer-
ized version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) with post-decision
wagering (Persaud et al., 2007), followed by two versions of our
learning task (Figure 1A) without knowledge of the task structure
or the payoffs. Data from these prior tasks are not analyzed or
presented in the present study, but it is important to note that they
FIGURE 1 |Task structure. (A)The learning task with post-decision
wagering. Four decks were presented to subjects on a computer display.
After subjects chose a card, they wagered either $50 or $25. Subjects saw
the outcome of the trial immediately after wagering. (B)The explicit risk
aversion task. Identical payoff structures were used as in the learning task.
The payoff structure was depicted with pie charts. The probability with
which each pie chart would be selected was indicated by a yellow
percentage. Subjects wagered either $50 or $25. (C)The payoff structures
for four decks in the simple (left) and the complex (right) version of the
tasks.
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provided all subjects with a substantial and equal amount of prior
background experience.
Each subject then underwent two phases of the experiment in
the same ﬁxed order:
Phase 1–Two versions of the learning task with post-decision
wagering, after being informed of the payoff distributions from
the different types of decks, 100 trials each.
Phase 2–Two versions of the explicit risk aversion task
(Figure 1B), the ﬁrst version with 50 trials of the “simple” gamble
and the secondwith 100 trials of the“complex”gamble (Figure 1C,
see below for details of different versions of the task).
Subjects were familiarized with the tasks and post-decision
wagering through practice trials (∼20 trials). Within each phase,
the order of the two versions of the tasks was randomized across
subjects. Questionnaires were given after each phase to make sure
subjects understood the tasks.
Subjects were paid a ﬁxed amount for their participation ($5),
a ﬁxed amount ($3) for the IGT, as well as a variable amount
for their performance (mean= $5.34) in the learning and explicit
tasks. For the learning task, subjects were paid the amount they
earned, which was divided by 2000. For the explicit risk aversion
task, subjects were paid at the end of their experiment, based on
their earnings from one randomly selected trial.
Experiment 2
We conducted Experiment 2 with 20 naïve Caltech subjects. The
tasks in Experiment 2were identical to those in Experiment 1,with
four important differences:
1) Subjects did not receive any prior background tasks (IGT or
learning task), as they had in Experiment 1.
2) The two phases were done in a ﬁxed order (Phase 2 ﬁrst, then
Phase 1), counterbalancing the order from Experiment 1.
3) Subjects underwent two explicit risk aversion tasks, 100 trials
of the “simple” and 100 trials of the “complex” gamble. Unlike
Experiment 1, here we paid subjects for every trial, in order to
match the payment scheme with the learning task (see below
for details).
4) All subjects were tested simultaneously in a social science
experimental laboratory with many cubicles with computer
terminals for each individual rather than individually as in
Experiment 1.
In this experiment, subjects were paid a ﬁxed amount for their
participation ($10) in addition to a variable amount based on
their performance in all four tasks (simple and complex versions
of the explicit and learning tasks). Prior to each phase, subjects
were familiarized with each task through 10 practice trials.
LEARNING TASK WITH POST-DECISION WAGERING
Subjects were given a $2000 loan of play money in the begin-
ning and told that their goal was simply to earn as much play
money as possible. In each trial, four decks with different col-
ored symbols were presented on the display (Figure 1A). Subjects
clicked on one of the decks using a mouse. After selecting a card,
they wagered either $50 or $25 by clicking on the upper or lower
half of the ﬂipped card, respectively. After wagering, the payoff
of the selected card was displayed as a multiplier for the wagered
amount (X WAGER). For example, if a subject wagered $50 and
got aX(−2) payoff, theywould lose $100 in that trial. Note that the
ﬁnal outcome (i.e., loss of $100) was not shown to the subjects.
At the time of the payoff, the positive multiplier was associated
with a happy icon and a positive laughter sound (070-who2.wav1)
while the negative multiplier was associated with a sad icon and
an obnoxious sound of shattered glass (truckcollide.wav2).
We randomized the spatial positions of the decks in each trial,
thus forcing subjects to learn solely about the association between
their appearance and their payoff. To encourage quick decisions
relying on gut feelings, we instructed subjects to respond within
1.5 s after the deck presentation. If they did not move the mouse
within this time interval, we randomized the deck positions again
(<5% of trials). If they moved the mouse to one of the decks but
failed to click on it, we regarded the deck under the mouse cur-
sor as their choice (<5% of trials). We did not impose any time
pressure for wagering responses.
We employed two learning tasks differing in complexity. In the
simple version of the task, the payoff was either X(+1) or X(−1;
Figure 1C left). The expected payoff was positive (+0.6) for one
deck and negative (−0.4) for the other three decks. In the com-
plex version of the task (Figure 1C right), the possible payoffs
were X(+2),X(+1),X(−1), and X(−2). The expected payoff was
positive (+0.6) for two decks and negative (−0.6) for the other
two decks. In the complex version, one positive, and one nega-
tive deck had high variance (2.44) and the others had low variance
(1.84).We refer to positive (or negative) decks as“good”(or“bad”)
decks.
The theoretical expected earnings over 100 trials with random
deck choice are $-281.25 for the simple version and $0 for the
complex version. In Experiment 1, subjects earned $781± 474
(mean± SD) in the simple version and $747± 346 in the complex
version, and in Experiment 2, subjects earned $345± 347 in the
simple version and $891± 408 in the complex version, conﬁrm-
ing that subjects performed well above-chance (p < 10−6 for both
versions in both experiments, one-tailed t -test).
Subjects were told that the optimal strategy is (1) to initially
explore the four decks while wagering $25 and (2) to exploit
the good deck while wagering $50 once they notice which deck
is most likely to give a positive payoff. 35 out of 36 subjects
discovered the good deck and then repeatedly chose from it
(Figure 2A)3. After six to eight consecutive choices from a good
deck, we showed a text message, “Game Restarted,” on the dis-
play to notify the subject that the deck-reward contingencies were
reassigned and that the subject should explore again (red bars
in Figure 2A). The number of consecutive choices required for
each reassignment was randomly chosen from six to eight to
reduce subjects’ anticipation for the next reassignment and to
have sufﬁcient trials to observe the evolution of wagering behavior
(Figure 2B).
1http://www.moviewavs.com/
2http://download848.mediaﬁre.com/
3Weobserved one subject who purposely chose froma bad deck every few trials. This
subject told us after the experiment that he tried to beat our game by occasionally
selecting a bad deck after selecting the good deck a few times in a row.
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FIGURE 2 | Results from one subject in the complex learning task.
(A)The history of card selection. Initially, the subject sampled from four
decks, then discovered the good deck and stuck with this deck until the
reshufﬂe (red vertical bars). Small red arrows indicate the trial where the
subject started to choose from the good deck consistently, which we
deﬁne as “the onset of good deck choice.” The red circles indicate the trials
where the subject received a negative payoff. (B)The history of actual
wagering (red) and the predicted probability of a high wager based on the
explicit task results (blue). (C)The Bayesian probability for an objectively
good deck [the good deck in the upper row in (A)] being a good deck. As
the evidence accumulates, this probability updates from 0.5 (the Bayesian
prior). It increases when this good deck is selected with a positive outcome
or when other decks are selected with a negative outcome. (D)The aligned
results of nine onsets of consecutive good deck selection from this subject.
The probability of good deck selection (black) and wagering high (red) are
aligned at the onsets (shown as the red arrow). The green line is the
Bayesian probability of the chosen deck being a good deck.
EXPLICIT RISK AVERSION TASK
To measure each subject’s risk aversion, we employed a standard
technique from experimental economics. In each trial, we showed
two or four pie charts for the simple or the complex version of the
risk aversion task, respectively (Figure 1B). These pie charts are
identical to the payoff distribution charts from the instructions for
the learning task (Figure 1C). The goal was to mimic the infor-
mation structure from the learning task as closely as possible in
order to maximize the predictive power of the risk aversion model
from one task to the other. During the wagering stage, the learning
task can be thought of as being equivalent to the risk aversion task,
except that in the learning task the subjects estimate the probabili-
ties (indicated explicitly here in yellow in Figure 1B) based on their
previous card draws. For example, in the simple version of the risk
aversion task, if the good and bad decks have explicitly stated prob-
abilities of 70% and 30% respectively, this would correspond to a
situation in the learning task,where the subject draws a card froma
deck they believe to be good and is (subjectively) 70% sure that the
chosen deck is good (a good deck is a deck with positive expected
payoff). In reality, its unlikely that subjects assign explicit proba-
bilities to the decks in the learning task. But theymay behave“as if”
they are tracking the Bayesian probabilities (Hampton et al., 2006).
The probabilities assigned to the pie charts in the explicit task
ranged from 0.25 to 0.70 for the simple version and from 0.35
to 0.85 for the complex version. There was no time restriction.
The order of the simple and complex versions was randomized
across subjects. In this explicit task, the subjects’ goal was again to
maximize their payoff.
InExperiment 1 and2,we implemented twoways of payment in
this explicit task. In Experiment 1, we randomly picked one of the
150 trials from the explicit tasks (combining simple and complex
versions), selected one of the pie charts according to their proba-
bilities, then selected one of the possible payoffs from that pie chart
according to the probabilities in the chart, and ﬁnally multiplied
the chosen payoff by the subject’s wager. Subjects were shown this
procedure on the display animation and understood this proce-
dure during practice sessions for both versions of the explicit task.
In Experiment 2, we gave subjects a $2000 loan of play money in
the beginning and we told them that the goal was simply to earn as
much playmoney as possible.We gave trial-by-trial feedback (with
the same sound and icon as in the learning task), accumulated the
total amount of play money and paid subjects the amount they
earned which was divided by 2000.
BAYESIAN UPDATING TO ESTIMATE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY
We computed the Bayesian probability of the chosen deck being
the good deck using a Bayesian model (Figure 2C). Brieﬂy, this
model computes the probability of each deck being the good deck,
given the distribution of payoffs from each type of deck (good or
bad) and the actual history of positive and negative payoffs to the
subject. The probabilities for all four decks were updated after each
choice. We describe the details of our Bayesian model and assess
how well our assumptions are justiﬁed in the Appendix.
The Bayesian model of learning that we used was chosen for
its simplicity and descriptive power in other learning research
(Ghahramani, 2001; Daw et al., 2005; Hampton et al., 2006;
Brodersen et al., 2008).We compared our Bayesian model with the
prevailing cognitive models (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002), includ-
ing a variant of reinforcement learning,and showed that ourmodel
is superior inpredicting choices andwagers.Wedescribe thedetails
of the model comparison in the Appendix.
PREDICTING WAGERING BEHAVIOR IN THE LEARNING TASK AND DATA
FITTING
In the explicit task, the probability of subjects wagering high
increases with the probability for the good deck in a sigmoidal
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manner (Figures 3C,D,G,H, blue curves). Combining this psycho-
metric function in the explicit task with the Bayesian probabilities
computed in each trial, we tried to predict the probability of a
high wager in the learning trials. If the subjects were learning the
probabilities like Bayesians (even roughly) then their choice char-
acteristics in the explicit risk aversion task should help predict their
wagering behavior in the learning task.
We used local regression to obtain smooth psychometric curves
shown in Figures 3C,D,G,H and 4G,H. We used the Locﬁt pack-
age (Loader, 1999) included in the Chronux Toolbox4 (Mitra and
Bokil, 2008) in MATLAB. We used a Gaussian kernel and a bino-
mial local likelihood ﬁtting family. To stabilize the ﬁt, we deﬁned
the probability of a high wager as 0 at a good deck probability
of 0. For each subject, we optimized the smoothing width using
a cross-validation method by (1) randomly dividing the dataset
into halves, a training and a test data set, (2) obtaining the best ﬁt
to the training set for each of the different smoothing widths, and
(3) computing the squared difference between the ﬁtted curve and
the actual data from the test set, which was not used during curve
ﬁtting. We repeated the above cross-validation procedure 10 times
and chose the smoothing width that minimized the overall error
for the test set. For Figures 3C,D,G,H, we averaged the derived
smoothed curves across subjects.
RISK AVERSION INDEX AND RISK-SENSITIVITY INDEX
We deﬁned a risk aversion index (RAI) as the point (x-axis in
Figures 3C,D,G,H) where the probability of a high wager (y-axis)
reaches 0.5. We derived the RAI from the ﬁtted curve for each sub-
ject. We also deﬁned a risk-sensitivity index (RSI) as the steepness
of the ﬁtted curve as follows:
RSI =
(Probability of high wager at p = 0.75)
−(Probability of high wager at p = 0.25)
0.75 − 0.25
Due to the nature of the task and noise in the learning task, tra-
ditional models of risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Rabin, 2000; Holt and Laury, 2002) did not ﬁt the data well.
Our measures of risk aversion are simple but do a better job of
characterizing subjects’ risk aversion, as demonstrated by the high
within-subject correlations between the simple and complex ver-
sions of the explicit tasks as well as those of the learning tasks (see
Results).
RESULTS
LEARNING TASK WITH POST-DECISION WAGERING
In our novel learning task, the deck-payoff contingency switched
after subjects repeatedly selected cards from a deck with posi-
tive expected value (a “good” deck). In each trial, subjects ﬁrst
selected a card from one of four decks, and then wagered either
$50 or $25. Immediately after wagering, subjects saw their pay-
off as a multiplier of the wager amount, that is, either X(+2),
X(+1),X(−1), or X(−2). The total amount of the payoff (i.e., the
wagered amount times the multiplier) was not shown explicitly on
the display (Figure 1A).
4http://chronux.org/
We show a typical subject’s behavior for deck selection and
wagering in Figures 2A,B. Initially, the subject sampled from sev-
eral decks, then settled on the good deck. He stuck with this deck
until the reshufﬂe. As for wagering, he started off wagering low but
eventuallywagered high after several selections from the gooddeck
(red line).After the reshufﬂe,he returned towagering low. Interest-
ingly, his actual wagering behavior lagged behind his theoretically
predicted wagering behavior (blue line), which incorporated his
risk aversion as measured in the explicit task (see below). This
lag is consistent with non-conscious optimal choice, and we will
return to this point later.
To analyze when subjects started to wager high, in Figures 2D
and 3A,B,E,F, we aligned card selection and wagering to the onset
of good deck selection. Figure 2D shows that the exemplar subject
never wagered high (the red line) before he found the good deck.
On subsequent draws from the good deck, the subject increasingly
wagered high, and by the sixth card the subject was always wager-
ing high. Figures 3A,B (Experiment 1, n = 16) and Figures 3E,F
(Experiment 2, n = 20) show similar trends at the group level
in both the simple and complex versions of the learning task
in both experiments. Subjects wagered high (the red lines) on
less than 100% of the trials even after repeatedly choosing from
the good deck (up to seven cards after the onset of good deck
selection).
This alone does not yet prove that subjects were choosing the
advantageous gooddeck(s)without conscious awareness; itmerely
suggests that subjects needed to build up to a certain level of conﬁ-
dence in their selection before making a high wager. We therefore
used a Bayesian model to estimate subjects’ beliefs about which
decks were the good ones and then used those beliefs to predict
the subjects’ wagering behavior. The model’s prediction was based
on the past history of outcomes for the subjects as well as their risk
aversion.
EXPLICITLY MEASURING RISK AVERSION
To measure risk aversion, we asked subjects to wager $50 or $25
in a situation where the probability of the chosen deck being
good or bad was explicitly available (the explicit risk aversion task,
Figure 1B). Note that in the learning task (Figure 1A), subjects
might never have had an explicit representation of this probabil-
ity, even if they computed it implicitly in order to guide choice and
wagering.
The resulting psychometric curves for high wagers in the
explicit task are shown by the blue curves in Figures 3C,D,G,H. As
an example, for the simple version of the explicit task in Experi-
ment1, subjects wagered high more than 90% of the time when the
probability of being a good deck exceeded 0.65. Theywagered high
only 50% of the time when the explicit probability of being a good
deck was 0.55, consistent with published risk aversion results from
experimental economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Rabin,
2000; Holt and Laury, 2002).
We then analyzed how often subjects wagered high in the learn-
ing task as a function of theBayesian probability of the chosendeck
being the good one (Figures 3C,D,G,H, red curves).Whenmaking
their wagering decisions in the learning task, subjects’ psychome-
tric curves shifted to the right, suggesting that they became more
risk-averse. Furthermore, the curves becameﬂatter, suggesting that
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FIGURE 3 |Wagering behavior in the learning task cannot be completely
accounted for by the risk aversion measured in the explicit task [(A–D):
Experiment 1; (E–H): Experiment 2]. (A,B,E,F)The actual probability of a high
wager (red) is aligned across multiple onsets of good deck selection [(A,E) for
the simple version and (B,F) for the complex version of the learning task]. The
x -axis denotes the trial relative to the onset of good deck selection. The
probability of good deck selection (black) as well as the predicted probability
of a high wager (based on the explicit task; blue) are also aligned at the onset
of good deck selection. The black vertical bars indicate a signiﬁcant difference
between the predicted and actual probability of a high wager. *, **, and ***
indicate signiﬁcance levels of p <0.05, p <0.01, and p <0.001, respectively.
(C,D,G,H)The probability of a high wager as a function of the explicit
probability in the risk aversion task (blue) and as a function of the Bayesian
probability in the learning task (red) for the simple (C,G) and for the complex
(D,H) versions of the tasks. The curves are obtained by averaging individually
ﬁtted curves using local regression. Shading denotes 1 SEM across subjects.
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FIGURE 4 | Subject-specific risk aversion indices (RAI) are correlated
between the simple and complex versions of the tasks, but not between
the explicit and learning tasks. (A,B) RAI was highly correlated between the
simple (x -axis) and complex (y -axis) versions within the explicit tasks (A) and
within the learning tasks (B). (C,D) RAI was uncorrelated across the learning
(x -axis) and the explicit task (y -axis) in either the simple (C) or the complex
(D) versions. Blue dots represent subjects from Experiment 1 and green dots
represent subjects from Experiment 2. (E–H)The results from two exemplar
subjects indicated by the red arrows in (D). Their behaviors are presented in
the same format as in Figures 3A–D. (E,G) A subject who preferred to wager
high in the learning but not in the explicit task. (F,H) A subject who showed
extreme risk aversion only in the learning task.
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subjects were less sensitive to the payoffs during the learning task.
To quantify these effects, we computed two indices for each sub-
ject: a RAI and a RSI. RAI represents the explicit probability of
the deck being “good” at which subjects wagered high in 50% of
the trials. RAI approaches 1 if subjects are risk-averse (i.e., those
who wager high only when they are sure to win). If subjects are
risk-neutral, RAI is 0.45 (due to the negative expected payoffs
for the random choice strategy) for the simple and 0.5 for the
complex versions of the task. In Experiment 1 (Figures 3C,D),
RAI was higher in the learning tasks (RAI= 0.633 for the simple
and 0.775 for the complex) than in the explicit risk aversion tasks
(RAI= 0.548 for the simple and 0.576 for the complex, paired t -
test, p = 0.007 for the simple, and p = 0.002 for the complex). In
Experiment 2 (Figures 3G,H), for the complex version, RAI was
higher in the learning tasks (RAI= 0.702) than in the explicit tasks
(RAI= 0.520, p = 0.045). For the simple version, RAI in the learn-
ing task (0.476) was not different from that in the explicit task
(RAI= 0.467, p = 0.15). RSI is the slope of the curve, representing
the sensitivity to the change in probability. In Experiment 1, RSI
was smaller in the learning tasks (RSI= 1.12 for the simple and
0.70 for the complex) than in the explicit tasks (RSI= 1.97 for the
simple and 1.78 for the complex, paired t -test, p < 10−5 for both
the simple and the complex versions). In Experiment 2, RSI was
also smaller in the learning tasks (RAI= 1.06 for the simple and
0.949 for the complex) than in the explicit tasks (RAI= 1.87 for
the simple and 1.83 for the complex, p < 10−4 for both the simple
and the complex versions).
Overall, the results from Experiment 1 and 2 were consis-
tent although there was some difference in the simple version of
the task. RAI in both the learning and explicit task was signiﬁ-
cantly lower in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1 (unpaired t -test,
p = 0.016 for the learning and p < 0.001 for the explicit task; see
Discussion). The RSI was not signiﬁcantly different between the
two experiments.
Looking at Figure 3C more closely, in the explicit task sub-
jects wagered high in 100% of the trials where the probability of
choosing from the good deck was 70%. However, in the learning
task they wagered high in less than 65% of the trials where the
Bayesian probability was at the same level. Our analysis reveals
that this phenomenon is a combined effect of lower RSI (i.e., ﬂat-
ter psychometric curves) indicating an insensitivity to the payoffs,
and higher RAI (i.e., rightward shift of the curves) indicating that
subjects were more risk-averse during the learning task than the
explicit task.
THE DELAYED ONSET OF AWARENESS COMPARED TO THE ONSET OF
GOOD CARD CHOICE
We predicted the probability of a high wager for each trial in
the learning task based on the actual payoff history in the learn-
ing task and the risk aversion proﬁle in the explicit task (as in
Figures 3C,D,G,H). First, we computed the Bayesian probability
for each trial based on the history of payoffs (Figure 2C). Then,we
derived the probability of a high wager by drawing a vertical line
from the Bayesian probability (on the x-axis) in the risk aversion
sigmoidal curve and ﬁnding the corresponding y-value. This was
repeated for each trial (Figure 2B, blue curve). If there is a period
of non-conscious decision making, we should see a gap between
the actual and the predicted probability of high wagers even after
taking into account each subject’s risk aversion.
In Figures 3A,B,E,F, the blue curves show the proportion of tri-
als inwhich subjects would havewagered high if they had explicitly
been shown the Bayesian probability that they were choosing from
the good deck. We see that subjects wagered high much less fre-
quently in the actual gambling task (red) than predicted based on
risk aversion and the Bayesian probabilities (blue). In both experi-
ments, the gaps between the two curves were signiﬁcantly different
at most points: in Experiment 1 for the simple version, p < 0.05
for points from +1 to +5, p = 0.055 for +6, and p = 0.088 for +7;
for the complex, p < 0.05 for all the points after 0, and in Exper-
iment 2 for the simple, p < 0.05 for points from +1 to +7 except
+5 (p = 0.069); for the complex, p < 0.05 for all the points from
0 to +6, and p = 0.062 for +7; two-tailed paired t -test, corrected
for multiple comparisons for trial 0 to trial +7 with false discovery
rate (FDR) of 0.05 (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
Thus, even when we take into account the effects of risk
aversion, we still ﬁnd that subjects did not wager optimally. We
conclude that we cannot fully explain the gap between choosing
optimally and wagering high (Bechara et al., 1997; Persaud et al.,
2007) based solely on risk aversion (Clifford et al., 2008a; Schurger
and Sher, 2008; Dienes and Seth, 2010).
RISK AVERSION IN THE LEARNING TASK IS UNCORRELATED WITH THAT
MEASURED IN THE EXPLICIT TASK
Even if risk aversion does not completely account for behavior in
the learning task,we would expect to see a correlation between risk
aversion measures in the two tasks, since it is generally assumed
that risk aversion is an individual personality trait that should
be fairly stable across tasks, especially over short periods of time
(Harrison et al., 2005; Koch and Preuschoff, 2007). To check this
assumption, we ran a correlation analysis on the risk aversion
measures.
Within-subject RAIs were highly correlated between two lev-
els of payoff complexity within the explicit tasks for Experi-
ment 1 (Figure 4A, blue dots, Spearman correlation test:ρ= 0.81,
p = 0.00022) and for Experiment 2 (green dots, ρ= 0.58,
p = 0.01). This was also true within the learning tasks for Exper-
iment 1 (Figure 4B, blue dots, ρ= 0.6, p = 0.024) and Experi-
ment 2 (green dots, ρ= 0.5, p = 0.026). When we combined data
from both Experiment 1 and 2, we found strong correlations
within the explicit (ρ= 0.72, p = 1.2× 10−6) and the learning
tasks (ρ= 0.5, p = 0.0028). This reliable correlation is consistent
with the assumption that risk aversion is a ﬁxed factor speciﬁc to
each subject.However,within-subject RAIs across the learning and
the explicit tasks were uncorrelated in both levels of task complex-
ity. Within the simple version, the correlation coefﬁcient (ρ) was
−0.24 (p = 0.39) in Experiment 1, 0.021 (p = 0.93) in Experiment
2 and 0.19 (p = 0.28) when we combined the data from Experi-
ment 1 and 2 to increase statistical power (see Figure 4C). Within
the complex version, we again found no correlation between
the tasks (ρ=−0.28, p = 0.31 for Experiment 1; ρ=−0.074,
p = 0.76 for Experiment 2; ρ=−0.15, p = 0.39 for combined;
see Figure 4D). We show exemplar subjects who showed strik-
ing inconsistency between the learning and the explicit tasks in
Figures 4E–H.
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MEAN CHOICE-WAGER GAP IN THE LEARNING TASK IS
UNCORRELATED WITH RAI MEASURED IN THE EXPLICIT TASK
To verify that risk aversion is uncorrelated between tasks, we
further analyzed the correlation between RAI estimated from
the explicit task (50% crossing points of the blue curves in
Figures 3C,D,G,H) and mean choice-wager gap from the learning
task (i.e., the mean difference between black and red curves from
0 to +7 in Figure 2D). RAI from the explicit task did not correlate
with themean choice-wager gap in the simple (ρ= 0.021,p = 0.94)
or complex version (ρ=−0.13, p = 0.65) of Experiment 1 nor
in the simple (ρ= 0.18, p = 0.45) or complex version (ρ= 0.23,
p = 0.34) of Experiment 2.
We also analyzed the correlation betweenRAI andmean choice-
wager gap both estimated from the learning task. Within the
learning task, RAI was correlated with the mean choice-wager
gap in the simple (ρ= 0.55, p = 0.034) and the complex ver-
sion (ρ= 0.83, p = 0.00012) of Experiment 1 as well as in the
simple (ρ= 0.54, p = 0.014) and the complex version (ρ= 0.48,
p = 0.033) of Experiment 2.
Taken together, the gap between actual choice and wagering
behavior in the learning task was not correlated with risk aversion
estimated from the explicit task, while it was correlated with the
risk aversion estimated from the learning task. This is consistent
with the results presented in Figure 4.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SIMPLE AND COMPLEX VERSION OF THE
TASK
We used a simple and a complex version of the task to allow easy or
more difﬁcult conscious access to the contingencies between decks
and their expected outcomes (see Figure 1C and Materials and
Methods for details). We expected to observe an increased period
of non-conscious decision making in the complex version as the
complexity of the payoff histories exceeds the capacity of con-
scious working memory (Bechara et al., 1997; Dijksterhuis et al.,
2006). When we aligned all the variables at the onset of good deck
selection (Figures 3A,B,E,F), the difference between the predicted
and the actual probability of high wagers (i.e., the gap between the
blue and red curves from trial 0 to +7) was larger in the complex
version than in the simple version (p = 0.0075 for Experiment 1
and p = 0.0013 for Experiment 2). This is consistent with the idea
that non-conscious decision making is likely to be induced when
the task is more complex.
DISCUSSION
The original IGT has been cited as evidence for non-conscious
decision making. However, due to its unconstrained nature, there
maybe alternative explanations other thannon-consciousdecision
making. Here we reported evidence that casts doubt on several
of those alternative explanations. To exclude explanations due
to risk aversion and ambiguity aversion (Fellows, 2004; Dunn
et al., 2006; Koch and Preuschoff, 2007; Clifford et al., 2008a,b;
Schurger and Sher, 2008; Dienes and Seth, 2010; Fleming and
Dolan, 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010), we modiﬁed the original
IGT in several respects. In particular, we showed that risk aver-
sion could not explain the entire effect of non-conscious decision
making in our task. Furthermore, we found that risk aversion
observed during the learning task was not correlated with risk
aversion elicited during a similar gambling task with explicit
probabilities. We suggest that these two types of risk aversion
may map onto an emotional feeling of risk on the one hand,
and an explicitly accessible representation of risk on the other
hand.
In our learning tasks, subjects were able to discover the good
decks and stick with them. However, as in Persaud et al. (2007),
we found that it generally took several choice–outcome experi-
ences from a good deck before subjects were willing to place
high wagers on the outcomes. Interestingly, some subjects con-
tinued to wager low even after selecting from the good deck six to
eight trials in a row. The reason for this reluctance to wager high
could be that subjects were unaware of the deck-reward contin-
gencies and selected cards using non-conscious decision making
(Bechara et al., 1997; Persaud et al., 2007). Alternatively, subjects
may have been risk-averse and not willing to wager high until
they were conﬁdent enough that they were choosing from the
good deck (Clifford et al., 2008a; Schurger and Sher, 2008). What
we found partially supports both explanations: subjects showed
strong risk aversion in our modiﬁed version of the IGT, that is,
they showed RAI values signiﬁcantly larger than risk-neutral in
all the learning tasks except the simple version in Experiment
2. However, this did not account for all of the temporal gap
between the onsets of optimal choice and advantageous wagering
in the experiments. We conclude that people can choose advanta-
geously without full awareness of why they do so, at least to some
extent.
By carrying out two independent experiments on two pools
of naïve subjects (n = 16 and 20), we replicated most of the
ﬁndings. With two different experiments, we ruled out some of
the potential artifacts, including the effects of (1) the extent of
prior practice, (2) the order of the learning and explicit risk aver-
sion task, (3) the presence of trial-by-trial feedback and payment,
and (4) the testing environment (one-to-one experiment typical
of psychophysics experiments and group experiments typical of
experimental economics).
While most effects between the two experiments were sim-
ilar, we observed two differences in the simple version of the
task. First, in both the learning and the explicit task, the RAI
was lower for Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. The lower lev-
els of risk aversion in Experiment 2 would be expected when
paying subjects for many trials rather than one, but we can-
not rule out the possibility that the other experimental changes
played a role as well. Second, the RAI was not different between
the explicit and learning tasks in the simple version in Experi-
ment 2 (Figure 3G). This could be because the simple version
of the task itself may not be optimal to induce the effects that
we were looking for. This interpretation is consistent with past
studies (Bechara et al., 1997; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), suggesting
that evidence for non-conscious decision making is more evident
in complex tasks where subjects rely less on conscious working
memory.
NON-CONSCIOUS DECISION MAKING AND POST-DECISION WAGERING
In this study, we applied post-decision wagering to assess if advan-
tageous decision making can occur non-consciously. While our
wagering procedure asked subjects to simply bet high or low,
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we do not believe that subjects’ conﬁdence level is all or noth-
ing, as is sometimes assumed in perceptual consciousness. In fact,
we believe that conﬁdence is graded and more or less continu-
ous on a trial-by-trial basis, which is the basis of our Bayesian
model.
Over the last decades, convincing evidence for non-conscious
processing has been established in at least two ways. First,
while showing complete lack of detectability/discriminability (e.g.,
chance performance or d′ = 0) of stimuli with a direct task that
assesses awareness of the stimuli, robust non-conscious processing
has been shownwith indirectmeasures, such as behavioral priming
effects and neurophysiological signals (for a review, see Hannula
et al., 2005; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007). Second, above-chance
behavioral performance can be considered to be non-consciously
mediated if the level of conscious conﬁdence, reported in a forced
manner, is completely uncorrelated with performance (Kolb and
Braun, 1995; Kunimoto et al., 2001; Persaud et al., 2007). Non-
conscious processing in our task has been established via the
second method with conscious conﬁdence indirectly assessed with
post-decision wagering.
Recently, the nature of post-decision wagering as a way to
assess conscious conﬁdence has been intensely debated (Koch and
Preuschoff, 2007; Clifford et al., 2008a; Schurger and Sher, 2008;
Dienes and Seth, 2010; Fleming and Dolan, 2010; Sandberg et al.,
2010). Some emphasize the advantage of post-decision wagering
(Koch and Preuschoff, 2007; Persaud et al., 2007). It is highly intu-
itive and easy to administer, even for children (Ruffman et al.,
2001) or animals (Kornell et al., 2007; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009),
compared to conﬁdence ratings. As post-decision wagering indi-
rectly assesses conscious conﬁdence, it is less likely to alter task
performance than direct conﬁdence ratings, which might affect
performance because it forces subjects to introspect in an unnat-
ural way (Koch and Preuschoff, 2007). Furthermore, the monetary
incentives ensure that subjects are motivated to reveal all the infor-
mation they have for their advantageous decisions (Persaud et al.,
2007).
Others have pointed out disadvantages with post-decision
wagering (Clifford et al., 2008a; Schurger and Sher, 2008; Dienes
and Seth, 2010; Fleming and Dolan, 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010).
Post-decisionwageringmay be subject to economic context,which
might inﬂuence conscious conﬁdence. For example, risk aversion
may lead to different wagering behavior even when the underlying
conscious conﬁdence is the same. In fact, using backward masking
in sensory psychophysics, Fleming and Dolan (2010) showed that
risk aversion discouraged high wagers. Furthermore, Sandberg
et al. (2010) have suggested that other meta-cognitive measures
such as a perceptual awareness scale could improve our ability to
detect weak conscious conﬁdence.
In our study, we chose post-decision wagering for the assess-
ment of conscious conﬁdence because we can use the same wager-
ing task during both learning and explicit risk aversion tasks and
we can directly examine the role of risk aversion on an individ-
ual basis across two very similar tasks. Future work is needed to
see whether non-conscious, advantageous decision making can be
conﬁrmed with other methods, such as allowing subjects to bet on
a continuous scale rather than just high or low.
ADVANTAGES OF OUR MODIFIED VERSION OF THE IGT
It has been argued that the task design of the IGT confounds
several factors known to play an important role in decision
making (Fellows, 2004; Sanfey and Cohen, 2004; Dunn et al.,
2006), which undermined previous attempts to demonstrate non-
conscious decision making. We sought to avoid these confounds
by modifying the original IGT in several important ways. First, we
incorporated post-decision wagering to indirectly measure sub-
jects’ conscious awareness of the deck-payoff contingency in every
trial (Persaud et al., 2007). Second, we introduced a reshufﬂing
procedure to observe multiple episodes of learning and choice
within a single subject, resulting in greater statistical power. Such
a feature is desirable not only for behavioral studies like ours,
but also for neurophysiological experiments (Fukui et al., 2005;
Oya et al., 2005). In fact, despite its wide application in behav-
ioral studies, the IGT, which can induce at most a single onset
of awareness, has been used only in a few imaging studies in
good part due to this statistical limitation. Third, we addressed
the concern about heterogeneous priors on the task structure by
explicitly telling the subjects the distributions of payoffs from the
four decks and letting them practice the task. This also helped
to eliminate the effects of ambiguity aversion, which have been
shown to cause subjects to avoid gambles with unknown prob-
abilities (Ellsberg, 1963; Camerer and Weber, 1992; Rode et al.,
1999; Hsu et al., 2005). This improvement was also critical for
our Bayesian modeling analysis. If subjects did not know anything
about the task structure we could still have used a reinforcement
learning algorithm (Oya et al., 2005), but it is unclear how to com-
bine such amodelwith risk aversion (Bossaerts et al., 2008). In fact,
the model comparison (see Appendix) suggests that our Bayesian
model with knowledge of the task structure performs better in
predicting subjects’ behavior than the one without this knowledge
and other related reinforcement learning models (Busemeyer and
Stout, 2002).
In fairness to alternative explanations, our experiment did not
explicitly measure subjects’ beliefs about the different deck prob-
abilities, and so we cannot rule out the possibility that subjects’
beliefswerenon-Bayesian.Althoughournovel gambling task elim-
inated ambiguity about the task structure, subjects still had to learn
and estimate the probabilities of selecting from a good deck and
were thus facing compound lotteries with potentially inaccurate
probabilities. In the learning task, there is the potential for indi-
vidual differences in learning rates, in differential memory for
positive versus negative payoffs, in ability to keep the payoff distri-
butions described in the instructions in working memory, and in
the discounting of past outcomes, etc. These individual differences
would have only affected the learning task but not the explicit task,
which could account for the divergence in risk aversion between
the tasks.We did observe that the psychometric curves relating the
probability of a high wager to the probability of being a good deck
(Figures 3C,D,G,H) were ﬂatter in the learning than in the explicit
tasks. Thoughwe described it as evidence that subjects become less
risk sensitive, alternative accounts are also possible. In the learning
task, inaccurate estimation of the probabilities could result in an
observed insensitivity to risk. Further experiments will be needed
to address these issues.
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MULTIPLE MECHANISMS FOR DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK
The behavioral and neural correlates of decision making under
risk have been extensively investigated and it has been shown
that components of risk, such as variance of probability and
reward, inﬂuence the activity of midbrain dopamine neurons
as well as the activation of ventral prefrontal, insular, and cin-
gulate cortices (Bechara et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2001;
Smith et al., 2002; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2007;
Christopoulos et al., 2009). Interestingly, Huettel et al. (2006)
have argued that decision making under risk and under ambi-
guity are supported by distinct mechanisms, with risk preference
encoded in the posterior parietal cortex and ambiguity pref-
erence encoded in the lateral prefrontal cortex. In our study,
we did not observe signiﬁcant correlation between risk aver-
sion in the learning and explicit tasks. It is even more intriguing
because the tasks were so similar and they were done in the same
session, with very similar stimuli and identical payoffs. Impor-
tantly, the high correlations of risk aversion between the simple
and complex versions of the task within each of the learning
and the explicit task ruled out that the non-signiﬁcant corre-
lations were due to subjects’ confusion, or a lack of statistical
power.
Inconsistency between risk aversion in the learning and the
explicit tasks (Figure 4) suggests the possibility of two separable
psychological processes for the computation of risk: one process
may depend on an explicit and verbally accessible representation
of risk (since this is how the risk information was provided in
the ﬁrst place), while the other process may depend on an emo-
tional feeling of risk based on experienced outcomes that need not
be accessible to explicit verbal report (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Our ﬁndings suggest a description–experience gap between risk
in explicit and implicit tasks. Recently, some studies have demon-
strated this description–experience gap. FitzGerald et al. (2010)
showed that the risk of learned options is correlated with activity
in the anterior cingulate cortex while the risk of described options
is correlated with activity in the bilateral anterior insula cortices.
Erev et al. (2010) found that decisions from description were pre-
dicted best by different models than those that predicted decisions
from experience.
Distinctive processes for risk computation have been suggested
in recent studies in normal subjects (Hertwig and Erev, 2009),
as well as with lesion patients and psychiatric populations. When
normal subjects learn probabilities from experience, they can show
a reversed risk preference compared to when they are notiﬁed of
the risk through description of the probabilities (Hertwig and
Erev, 2009). Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex can cognitively assess appropriate behaviors but cannot
act accordingly in real life, a dissociation which is in part repli-
cated in the IGT (Anderson et al., 1999; Krajbich et al., 2009).
Pathological gamblers are obsessed by risky gambles (Holden,
2001; Potenza et al., 2001). With some drug treatments, their
risk aversion can be enhanced to a level higher than in healthy
controls (Brañas-Garza et al., 2007), however, their pathologi-
cal behaviors are prone to relapse in real life (Holden, 2001).
Interestingly, these clinical populations are capable of comput-
ing risks cognitively. However, they fail to choose appropriately
in everyday life, possibly because of an inability to implement
risk mechanisms based on emotional feelings (Loewenstein et al.,
2001).
While Dienes and Seth (2010) found correlation between risk
aversion and thedegree of non-conscious knowledge inferred from
wagering, we did not get an analogous result. We believe that our
two separate risk models described above could explain this dis-
cordance. For tasks that do not involve learning and emotional
feeling of risks, such as those employed by Dienes and Seth, the
explicit riskmechanism is likely atwork.Obviously, further studies
are needed to test these ideas.
Taken together with these other results, the present ﬁndings
suggest that these two processes for risk computation may be
subserved by distinctive neuronal mechanisms within the pre-
frontal cortex (Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009),
posterior cingulate cortex (McCoy and Platt, 2005), and insula
or components of the basal ganglia (Preuschoff et al., 2006).
Whether emotional experiences (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al.,
1997, 2000) guide subjects in our learning task in a non-
conscious manner is an important open question for future
studies.
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APPENDIX
BAYESIAN INFERENCE MODEL: ASSUMPTION AND VALIDATION
We constructed a Bayesian inference model to estimate the prob-
ability of each deck being the good deck. This estimated prob-
ability would be a good proxy of how actual subjects would
feel about each deck (1) if subjects have perfect memory of the
payoff structure and can keep track of the Bayesian probability
associated with each deck (assuming the Markov property) and
(2) if subjects understand and utilize the structure of the gam-
bling task. Further, (3) if subjects were to select the deck and
to wager on the chosen card based on the Bayesian probability,
we should be able to predict the choice and the wager behavior
well.
We quantiﬁed the performance of the Bayesian model in their
ability to predict subjects’ choices and wagers on a trial-by-
trial basis using signal detection theory (SDT; Macmillan and
Creelman, 2005).
For prediction of a choice in a given trial, we say that the model
made a correct prediction (i.e., hit) when it assigned the highest
Bayesian probability to the deck that the subject actually chose in
that trial. If the model assigned the highest probability to an uns-
elected deck, we regarded it as a false alarm. Further, we regarded
the assigned highest probability as the conﬁdence the model had
in each prediction. By shifting the threshold for this conﬁdence of
the model from zero to one,we were able to construct ROC curves,
which quantify how successfully the model could predict subjects’
behavior. For the following analysis, we computed the area under
the ROC curve, which we call A′ for short. A′ for the choice was
0.80± 0.13 (mean± SD) for the simple version and0.80± 0.11 for
the complex version in Experiment 1, and 0.77± 0.13 for the sim-
ple version and 0.74± 0.14 for the complex version in Experiment
2.
For prediction of wagering in a given trial, the model always
predicts a high wager with a conﬁdence expressed as the assigned
probability for the chosen deck. Again, by shifting the conﬁdence
threshold, we constructed ROC curves and computed A′ for the
wager prediction. A′ for the wagering was 0.87± 0.11 for the
simple version and 0.77± 0.13 for the complex version in Exper-
iment 1, and 0.84± 0.12 for the simple version and 0.82± 0.16
for the complex version in Experiment 2. Although it is far from
perfect (i.e., A′ = 1; p < 0.0005), A′ was signiﬁcantly higher than
chance [chance A′ would be 0.5, A′ > 0.5 with p < 10−6 (t -test)].
There could be several reasons why subjects’ choices and wagers
were sub-optimal. First, subjects may not remember the payoff
structures and lose track of the Bayesian probabilities (assumption
1 was wrong). This may be the case for the complex version, but is
highly unlikely for the simple version. Second, subjects might not
have understood or utilized the task structure. We took great care
to familiarize subjects with the procedures, showed them the pay-
off structures (Figure 1C) and even explained the optimal strategy
(see Materials and Methods) prior to the experiment. In Experi-
ment 1, there were three practice sessions before entering the ﬁnal
critical sessions. Still, it is possible that subjects may have adopted
other strategies, such as the “gambler’s fallacy”; A spurious belief
such as “after three positive outcomes in a row, I tend to receive a
negative outcome” might have affected their decisions, which we
did not model.
Below, we describe our implementation of the Bayesian model.
Assuming a subject satisﬁes assumptions 1 and 2, we can compute
the Bayesian probability of each deck being the good deck as:
pi,t = P(Di,t = Good), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (A1)
Where pi,t denotes the probability of deck i being the good deck at
trial t, and Di,t represents the state of deck i at trial t (Di,t =Good
or Di,t =Bad).
In the simple version of the learning task, there is only one good
deck, thus the sum of pi,t across the four decks is equal to 1.
∑
i=1,2,3,4
pi,t = 1 (A2)
In the complex version, there are two good decks, thus the sum
of pi,t across the decks is equal to 2.
∑
i=1,2,3,4
pi,t = 2 (A3)
After each trial, we update pi,t+1 using the Bayesian updating
rule based on the behavior and the outcome at trial t. We used a
two-stage updating rule, ﬁrst for the selected deck and then the
other three unselected decks.
The Bayesian updating rule for the selected deck
We applied the Bayesian model to update the probability of deck
i being a good deck at trial t + 1 (pi,t+1) based on the probability
of deck i being a good deck at trial t (pi,t) and the actual payoff
(value) observed at trial t (Vt, representing the reward or loss the
subject received at trial t ) as follows:
pi,t+1 = P
(
Di,t+1 = Good
) = P (Di,t = Good|Vt
)
= P
(
Vt |Di,t = Good
) · P (Di,t = Good
)
P (Vt )
= P
(
Vt |Di,t = Good
) · P (Di,t = Good
)
∑
i
P
(
Vt |Di,t
) · P (Di,t
)
=P(Vt |Di,t =Good) ∗ P(Di,t =Good)
/
(P(Vt |Di,t =Good)
∗ P(Di,t =Good) + P(Vt |Di,t = Bad) ∗ P(Di,t =Bad))
=P(Vt |Di,t =Good) ∗ P(Di,t =Good)
/
(P(Vt |Di,t =Good)
∗ pi,t + P(Vt |Di,t =Bad) ∗ (1 − pi,t ))
(A4)
The updating rule for the unselected decks
Following the update of pi,t+1 for the selected deck, we updated
pi,t+1 for the other decks that were not selected at trial t. Following
EqsA2 andA3,we updated the probability of each unselected deck
being a good deck at trial t+ 1 based on pi,t and the behavior and
the outcome at trial t as follows:
(a) If the selected deck gave a reward (i.e.,Vt > 0),
pi,t+1 = pi,t − pi,t∑
i={1,2,3,4},i =Ai
pi,t
· (pA,t+1 − pA,t
)
(A5)
where At represents the deck selected at trial t.
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(b) If the selected deck gave a punishment (i.e.,Vt < 0),
pi,t+1 = pi,t + 1 − pi,t∑
i={1,2,3,4}, i =Ai
(
1 − pi,t
) ·(pA,t − pA,t+1
)
(A6)
At the beginning of the experiment as well as after the reshufﬂe
of the deck-reward contingency, we reset pi,t to 0.25 and 0.5 for
the simple and the complex versions, respectively.
Equations A4–A6 have the Markov property that only knowl-
edge of the probabilities (pi,t, i = 1,2,3,4), selected action (At), and
the value of the action (Vt) from the current trial are needed to
calculate the probabilities of the next trial (pi,t+1, i = 1,2,3,4).
MODEL COMPARISON
Wecompared the performance of four othermodels to that of ours
in predicting subjects’ choices and wagers. Here, we used models
that represent three popular conceptual variants in the decision
making literature, especially the ones that were applied to the real
data in the IGT (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). We replicated Buse-
meyer and Stout’s four models: a Strategy-Switching Heuristic
Choice Model (Heuristic for short), a Bayesian-Expected Util-
ity Model (Bayes_EU for short), an Expectancy–Valence Learning
Model (this is essentially a reinforcement learning model, RL for
short), and a Baseline Model. We followed the exact deﬁnition
of these models and the readers can refer to (Busemeyer and
Stout, 2002) for the details of these models. While these mod-
els used three free parameters, our Bayesian model did not have
any free parameters to ﬁt. However, our Bayesian updating rules
and inclusion of the knowledge of the task structure constrains
the model in a way that may not be suitable for different tasks
other than ours. Thus, comparisons of the model based on the
number of free parameters or residual error in ﬁtting are not well
suited. Thus, we relied on the predictive performance based on
SDT (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) as a framework for model
comparison.
We tuned three parameters for a given set of the data (i.e., each
subject had the simple and the complex version of the learning
task, resulting in six free parameters) in each of these models care-
fully to ensure that the models were well ﬁtted. We quantiﬁed
whether each model could predict subjects’ choice and wagering
behavior using SDT as we did for our model. The results of the
model comparison are shown in Figure A1.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, three models from Buse-
meyer and Stout (2002), namely Baseline model, Heuristic model,
FIGUREA1 | Model comparison results of Experiment 1 (A,B,E,F) and
Experiment 2 (C,D,G,H). A′ (y -axis) was computed to quantify how well each
model (labeled on x -axis) can predict deck choice (A–D) and wagering
behavior (E–H). Simple (A,C,E,G) and complex (B,D,F,H) versions were
analyzed separately. Each black dot represents A′ of an individual subject.
Green squares denote the median of A′. Error bars denote 1 SEM across
subjects. RL, Busemeyer and Stout’s (2002) reinforcement learning model
(blue bars); Bayesian, our Bayesian inference model (red bars); Bayesian (w/o
K n), a version of our Bayesian inference model without incorporating the
knowledge of the task structure (magenta bars).
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Table A1 | Comparisons of prediction performance for deck choice.
B and S RL Our Bayesian p-Value
Exp 1 simple 0.77±0.13 0.80±0.13 p =0.16
Exp 1 complex 0.83±0.13 0.80±0.11 p =0.17
Exp 2 simple 0.78±0.10 0.77±0.13 p =0.69
Exp 2 complex 0.83±0.11 0.74±0.14 p =0.0014
Mean±1 SD.
and Bayes_EU model, performed poorly in all cases and we
will not describe them further. This trend is consistent with
Busemeyer and Stout’s (2002) model evaluation using G2 mea-
sures.
For predicting deck choice (Figures A1A–D), Busemeyer and
Stout’s (2002) RL model (blue bars) performed similarly to our
Bayesian inference model (red). For the details, see Table A1. We
evaluated the signiﬁcance of the difference with p-values from
two-tailed paired t -tests.
For predicting wagering behavior (Figures A1E–H), the RL
model performed signiﬁcantly worse than our Bayesian inference
model (red). For the details, see Table A2. We evaluated the sig-
niﬁcance of the difference with p-values from two-tailed paired
t -tests.
Table A2 | Comparisons of prediction performance for wagering
behavior.
B and S RL Our Bayesian p-Value
Exp 1 simple 0.80±0.11 0.87±0.11 p =0.032
Exp 1 complex 0.66±0.10 0.77±0.13 p =0.0015
Exp 2 simple 0.75±0.13 0.84±0.12 p =0.0043
Exp 2 complex 0.68±0.13 0.82±0.16 p =0.00022
Further, in all cases, our Bayesian inference model (red bars in
Figure A1) outperformed a variant of this Bayesian model that
does not incorporate knowledge of the task structure (magenta
bars in Figure A1, paired t -test, p < 0.05 in all cases).
Taken together, we conclude that the RL model predicts choice
behavior equally well or slightly better than our Bayesian inference
model while it predicts wagering behavior much worse than our
model in all cases.
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